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PROTECTING COMMON LAW RIGHTS OF THE 
UNIONIZED WORKER: DEMYSTIFYING SECTION 301 
PREEMPTION 
                                                               
Phillip J. Closius* 
 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
    Employers are frequently subject to employee lawsuits alleging a 
tort.  Non-unionized employees may seek damages for such conduct 
by their employers in state court.1  Unionized employees, however, 
face the risk that employers will seek to transfer the case to a federal 
district court in an attempt to immunize tort liability by claiming the 
complaint is preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations 
Act of 1947 (LMRA).2  Although § 301 remains essentially 
unchanged from the date of its adoption, judicial confusion over the 
scope of its preemptive effect frequently has broadened an 
employer’s ability to defeat state tort claims by its employees in the 
early stages of litigation with a motion to dismiss.3  As a result of this 
evolution and accompanying confusion, the common law rights of 
unionized workers have been unfairly circumscribed simply because 
their union entered into a collective bargaining agreement with their 
employer.4  Neither the statute’s framers nor the Supreme Court 
opinions which delineated § 301’s impact intended such an expansive 
result in favor of management.  A proper understanding of § 301 and 
its preemptive effect produces a judicial test which protects the 
 
* Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law.  A.B. University of Notre 
Dame (1972); J.D., Columbia (1975).  The author wishes to express his appreciation 
to Merritt Pridgeon, University of Toledo College of Law (2001), and William 
Sinclair, University of Virginia Law School (2002), for reviewing early drafts of this 
Article and Jacob Deaven, University of Baltimore School of Law (2016), for 
assistance with research. 
1. 29 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
2. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (2012). 
3. Some scholars have referred to a “presumption in favor of preemption.”  Robert M. 
Sagerian, A Penalty Flag for Preemption: The NFL Concussion Litigation, Tortious 
Fraud, and the Steel Curtain Defense of Section 301 of the Labor Management 
Relations Act, 35 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 229, 255 (2013).  
4. See Regina Goshorn, Section 301, Tortious Interference and the Sixth Circuit: 
Immunization for the Tortfeasor, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 253, 277 (2005). 
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common law rights of unionized workers while still ensuring that 
collectively bargained agreements will be enforced uniformly 
throughout the country.  
 A series of federal statutes regulate labor law in detail.  The genesis 
of this legislation is found in President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s 
New Deal.5  Prior to the involvement of Congress in the field, 
common law courts were often hostile to union activity.6  The 
Supreme Court found unions to be illegal combinations in restraint of 
the labor market and therefore, violative of the Sherman Act.7   Union 
members were also personally liable for any damages caused by their 
union.8  Harsh working conditions, the economic impact of the Great 
Depression, and the states’ failure to regulate effectively multi-state 
business entities all contributed to a pro-union political majority in 
the 1930s.9  The statutes passed during that era—the Norris-
LaGuardia Act of 1932,10 the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 
(often referred to as the “Wagner Act”),11 and the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 193812—form the basis of modern American labor 
law.  The other two bedrock statutes of labor law are the Labor 
Management Relations Act of 1947 (often referred to as the “Taft-
Hartley Act”)13 and the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure 
Act of 1959 (often referred to as the “Landrum-Griffin Act”).14  The 
political will which produced this statutory framework came from a 
desire to protect unions and the collective bargaining process, as well 
as stabilize employee access to a unionized workplace.15 
 
5. Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New 
Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1357 (1983).  
6. For use of the doctrine of criminal conspiracy as an anti-union legal doctrine, see 
Benjamin Levin, Blue-Collar Crime: Conspiracy, Organized Labor and the Anti-
Union Civil Rico Claim, 75 ALB. L. REV. 559, 577–86 (2012). 
7. See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 283, 297 (1908). 
8. Id. at 306, 308–09.  
9. See Levin, supra note 6, at 588–90, 597–601. 
10. Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 
101–115 (2012)). 
11. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 
U.S.C. § 151 (2012)). 
12. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (current version at 
29 U.S.C. § 201 (2012)). 
13. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) 
(current version at 29 U.S.C. § 141 (2012)). 
14. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. 86-257, 73 Stat. 
519 (1959) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 401 (2012)). 
15. See 29 U.S.C. § 141. 
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 Congress intended that labor relations generally be governed by 
federal law.16  In order to effectuate this goal, federal courts were 
given explicit jurisdiction over lawsuits involving disputes regarding 
the meaning of collective bargaining agreements.  Section 301 of the 
Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 states:  
(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and 
a labor organization representing employees in an industry 
affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between any 
such labor organizations, may be brought in any district 
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, 
without respect to the amount in controversy or without 
regard to the citizenship of the parties.17   
This statutory provision therefore expressly permits plaintiffs to file a 
contract claim in federal court and defendants to remove a contract 
claim originally filed in state court to federal court.   
   The Supreme Court has interpreted § 301 to be more than simply a 
statute granting jurisdiction.18  The Court has held that the 
substantive meaning of § 301 directs federal courts to create a body 
of national law for the enforcement of collective bargaining 
agreements and the promise to arbitrate grievances found therein.19  
Therefore, the Court also has held that § 301 preempts any state 
lawsuit alleging a contractual breach of a collective bargaining 
agreement.  However, in order to protect exclusive federal control 
over the meaning of such collective agreements, the Court also has 
held that state tort lawsuits, which were in fact contract claims, must 
also be preempted.20  This expanded preemptive effect of § 301 has 
led to confusion as judges have struggled to distinguish “real” tort 
claims from “disguised” tort claims that are actually contract claims 
 
16. See id. 
17. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, § 301(a), 61 Stat. 136, 
156–57 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2012)).  Section 301(b) 
provides, among other things, that a labor union may sue or be sued as an entity in 
federal court and that any money judgments against a union shall by enforceable 
only against the union as an entity and its assets, not the assets of its individual 
members.  Id. at § 301(b).  
18.       Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 450–51 (1957). 
19. Id. 
20. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 (1985). 
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for breach of a collective bargaining agreement.21  The lack of clarity 
has been exacerbated by the failure of some judges to distinguish 
between the substantive attributes of § 301 labor law and the 
requirements for preempting state law.22  Some courts have avoided a 
detailed preemptive analysis by citing the importance of arbitration in 
labor law and simply expanding the preemptive scope of § 301.23  
This judicial trend has unfairly limited the common law rights of 
unionized workers and has extended the reach of § 301 into disputes 
that were never intended to be federalized. 
   This Article asserts that the Supreme Court has delineated the 
preemptive effect of § 301 with more clarity than many lower courts 
realize.  Part II of this Article examines Supreme Court cases and 
preemptive principles contained therein.  Part III analyzes the 
accepted principles that have arisen from application of those 
Supreme Court opinions by lower courts.  Part IV discusses the main 
areas of confusion that still exist as lower courts seek to define § 301 
preemption.  Part IV also offers proposals to distinguish more clearly 
state tort claims which are truly based on traditional common law 
principles from tort claims that are actually disagreements over terms 
of a collective bargaining agreement. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT CASES       
   The Supreme Court first dealt with the meaning of § 301 in the 
seminal case of Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of 
Alabama.24  In that case, the union and the company executed a 
collective bargaining agreement which provided that there would be 
no strikes or work stoppages in exchange for a grievance procedure 
that involved good faith negotiation and, if that failed, arbitration.25  
The union filed grievances regarding workloads and work 
assignments.26  When negotiations failed, the union requested the 
agreed upon arbitration, and the employer refused.27  The union then 
filed a lawsuit in federal court to compel arbitration.28  The Court 
 
21. See McCormick v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 934 F.2d 531, 539 (4th Cir. 1991) (Phillips, 
J., dissenting). 
22. See infra notes 216–20 and accompanying text. 
23. See infra notes 218–20 and accompanying text. 
24. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 




2016 Demystifying Section 301 Preemption 111 
 
held that “§ 301(a) is more than jurisdictional—that it authorizes 
federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of 
these collective bargaining agreements and includes within that 
federal law specific performance of promises to arbitrate grievances 
under collective bargaining agreements.”29  The opinion further noted 
that the law to be applied was “federal law, which the courts must 
fashion from the policy of our national labor laws.”30  Since the union 
had given up the right to strike in exchange for the arbitration clause, 
the national policy favoring labor peace dictated that either side of 
the collective bargaining agreement have access to the full powers of 
the federal courts to enforce the clear terms of the contract.31  The 
result in favor of the union was consistent with the dictates of federal 
labor policy as revealed in the legislative history of § 301.32  
Therefore, while Lincoln Mills did not deal directly with the issue of 
the preemption of state law, the opinion is noteworthy for its holding 
that substantive federal common law would govern lawsuits for 
which § 301 provided federal jurisdiction.   
   The Supreme Court reiterated the principles of Lincoln Mills in its 
next major § 301 decision, Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co.33  The 
applicable collective bargaining agreement provided that the 
employer could discharge any worker if his work was not 
satisfactory.34  The agreement also contained a binding arbitration 
clause for resolving any differences in the true interpretation of the 
contract.35  Lucas Flour discharged an employee for unsatisfactory 
work.36  In response, the union went on strike for eight days.37  After 
the strike ended, the issue was submitted to arbitration as prescribed 
in the agreement, and the arbitration panel eventually held that the 
employee was validly fired.38  Lucas Flour thereafter filed a state 
lawsuit against the union seeking monetary damages for business 
 
29. Id. at 450–51. 
30. Id. at 456. 
31. Id. at 455. 
32. Id. at 453–56. 
33. 369 U.S. 95 (1962). 
34. Id. at 96. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 97. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
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losses caused by the strike.39  The state court awarded damages 
against the union in the amount of $6,501.60.40 
   The Court upheld the damage award against the union, but only 
because the strike was a breach of the agreement under federal, not 
state law.41  Section 301 depended upon a substantive federal labor 
law in order to provide interpretive uniformity of all collective 
bargaining agreements: 
The possibility that individual contract terms might have 
different meanings under state and federal law would 
inevitably exert a disruptive influence upon both the 
negotiation and administration of collective agreements.  
Because neither party could be certain of the rights which it 
had obtained or conceded, the process of negotiating an 
agreement would be made immeasurably more difficult by 
the necessity of trying to formulate contract provisions in 
such a way as to contain the same meaning under two or 
more systems of law which might someday be invoked in 
enforcing the contract.42  
The holdings in Lincoln Mills and Lucas Flour—that § 301 implied a 
preemptive, substantive federal labor law—was not controversial in 
the fact patterns of those cases.  Such a result was necessary to 
effectuate the recognized national labor policy of encouraging the 
peaceful resolution of management-labor disagreements through 
collective bargaining.  State law was preempted only in the context of 
lawsuits between an employer and a union to enforce explicit 
provisions of a relevant collective bargaining agreement.  Therefore, 
the two cases that created § 301 preemption applied it narrowly. 
   The Court next dealt with the issue twenty-three years later in Allis-
Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck.43  The fact pattern at issue provided the 
basis for expanding the scope of § 301 preemption beyond the 
holdings of Lincoln Mills and Lucas Flour.  Lueck was not a dispute 
between an employer and a union; rather, an employee filed the 
complaint alleging a tort against his employer.44  The collective 




41. Id. at 104. 
42. Id. at 103. 
43. 471 U.S. 202 (1985). 
44. Id. at 206. 
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provided benefits for non-occupational injuries to employees.45  The 
agreement also contained a grievance procedure which culminated in 
binding arbitration.46  After suffering a non-occupational back injury, 
Lueck filed a claim under the disability plan and won an award 
pursuant to it.47  Lueck later believed that Allis-Chalmers was trying 
to avoid paying the award in full by not making payments, delaying 
payments, or insisting that he see various doctors to reconfirm the 
extent of his injury.48  However, instead of filing a second grievance 
under the collective bargaining agreement, he filed a lawsuit in 
Wisconsin state court alleging that Allis-Chalmers had processed his 
claim in bad faith, a tort under state law.49  The issue, therefore, was 
whether § 301 preempted Lueck’s state-law claim.50 
   The Supreme Court began its analysis by citing Lucas Flour for the 
principle that “[a] state rule that purports to define the meaning or 
scope of a term in a contract suit therefore is pre-empted by federal 
labor law.”51  The opinion then significantly expanded the reach of § 
301 by noting that, in order to effectuate the national policies at stake, 
certain state tort lawsuits would be preempted in addition to those 
alleging breaches of contract: 
The interests in interpretive uniformity and predictability 
that require that labor-contract disputes be resolved by 
reference to federal law also require that the meaning given 
a contract phrase or term be subject to uniform federal 
interpretation.  Thus, questions relating to what the parties 
to a labor agreement agreed, and what legal consequences 
were intended to flow from breaches of that agreement, 
must be resolved by reference to uniform federal law, 
whether such questions arise in the context of a suit for 
breach of contract or in a suit alleging liability in tort.52  
However, the Court was equally clear that not all tort suits were 
proscribed by § 301: 
 
45. Id. at 214. 
46. Id. at 204. 
47. Id. at 205. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 206. 
50. Id. at 206–08. 
51. Id. at 210. 
52. Id. at 211. 
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Nor is there any suggestion that Congress, in adopting § 
301, wished to give the substantive provisions of private 
agreements the force of federal law, ousting any inconsistent 
state regulation.  Such a rule of law would delegate to 
unions and unionized employers the power to exempt 
themselves from whatever state labor standards they 
disfavored.  Clearly, § 301 does not grant the parties to a 
collective-bargaining agreement the ability to contract for 
what is illegal under state law.  In extending the pre-emptive 
effect of § 301 beyond suits for breach of contract, it would 
be inconsistent with congressional intent under that section 
to preempt state rules that proscribe conduct, or establish 
rights and obligations, independent of a labor contract.53   
The Court specifically noted in a footnote that preemption was not 
appropriate simply because a state tort lawsuit contained a claim that 
was a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.54  The opinion then 
stated the appropriate test for determining the extent of § 301 
preemption: 
Our analysis must focus, then, on whether the Wisconsin 
tort action for breach of the duty of good faith as applied 
here confers nonnegotiable state-law rights on employers or 
employees independent of any right established by contract, 
or, instead, whether evaluation of the tort claim is 
inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of 
the labor contract.  If the state tort law purports to define the 
meaning of the contract relationship, that law is pre-
empted.55  
 The Court concluded that Lueck’s claim was preempted pursuant to 
this test.  The key to the state claim was the interpretation of the 
phrase “good faith.”56  That concept was not independently defined 
by state law, but was necessarily related to the duty or obligation 
imposed on Allis-Chalmers by the terms and conditions of the 
contract.57  The Court stated, “Because the right asserted not only 
derives from the contract, but is defined by the contractual obligation 
of good faith, any attempt to assess liability here inevitably will 
 
53. Id. at 211–12 (footnote omitted). 
54. Id. at 212 n.7. 
55. Id. at 213. 
56. Id. at 215. 
57. Id. at 217. 
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involve contract interpretation.”58  Since Lueck’s claim could have 
been pled as a contract claim, his lawsuit was properly preempted.  
The opinion further noted that an additional reason for preempting 
Lueck’s state-law tort claim was the national policy of encouraging 
arbitration.59  The Court stated, “The need to preserve the 
effectiveness of arbitration was one of the central reasons that 
underlay the Court’s holding in Lucas Flour.”60 
The Court concluded by emphasizing the narrow focus of its 
holding: “Nor do we hold that every state-law suit asserting a right 
that relates in some way to a provision in a collective-bargaining 
agreement, or more generally to the parties to such an agreement, 
necessarily is pre-empted by § 301.”61  The inquiry must necessarily 
proceed on a case-by-case basis.  Since Lueck’s claim was 
“substantially dependent” upon an analysis of a provision in a 
collective bargaining agreement, the lawsuit must be treated as a 
labor claim under § 301 (and consequently dismissed for failure to 
use the grievance procedure) or dismissed as preempted by federal 
labor-contract law pursuant to § 301.62 
The Supreme Court expanded its understanding of § 301 
preemption in International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. 
Hechler.63  Hechler was a union member and electrical apprentice 
employed by Florida Power and Light Company.64  She was injured 
when she came into contact with highly energized equipment at her 
workplace.65  Hechler sued her union for damages related to her 
injuries, alleging the union had assumed a duty to ensure that she was 
provided with a safe workplace.66  After the union removed the case 
to federal court, Hechler conceded that the union’s duty was created 
solely by its collective bargaining agreement negotiated with Florida 
Power.67  In spite of that admission, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the 
District Court’s holding that the lawsuit was preempted by § 301.68  
The Court of Appeals ruled that, even if the duty was created by the 
 
58. Id. at 218. 
59. Id. at 219. 
60. Id.  
61. Id. at 220. 
62. Id.  
63. 481 U.S. 851 (1987). 
64. Id. at 853. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 854. 
68. Id. 
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collective bargaining agreement, the union’s liability would be 
assessed on traditional state negligence principles.69   
The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit by holding that 
Hechler had effectively alleged a “tortious breach-of-contract claim” 
that was preempted by § 301.70  The Court had earlier noted that 
“[t]he ordinary § 301 case is a contract claim in which a party to the 
collective-bargaining agreement expressly asserts that a provision of 
the agreement has been violated.”71  Although the parties in the case 
at bar were not an employer and a union, the same reasoning applied 
to a lawsuit by a worker against her union when the collective 
bargaining agreement created the duty: 
In order to determine the Union’s tort liability, however, a 
court would have to ascertain, first, whether the collective-
bargaining agreement in fact placed an implied duty of care 
on the Union to ensure that Hechler was provided a safe 
workplace, and, second, the nature and scope of that duty, 
that is, whether, and to what extent, the Union’s duty 
extended to the particular responsibilities alleged by 
respondent in her complaint.  Thus, in this case, as in Allis-
Chalmers, it is clear that “questions of contract 
interpretation . . . underlie any finding of tort liability.”72  
The Supreme Court earlier noted that the resolution of § 301 
preemption would be different if Hechler’s lawsuit was against 
Florida Power: “Under the common law, however, it is the employer, 
not a labor union, that owes employees a duty to exercise reasonable 
care in providing a safe workplace.”73  The common law tort would 
impose a duty on an employer, which would be independent of a 
collective bargaining agreement.74  Since the union had no equivalent 
common law responsibility, its duty could originate only from the 
agreement.75  Hechler’s tort lawsuit was therefore dependent on 
contract interpretation.76 
 
69. Id. at 855.   
70. Id. at 861, 865. 
71. Id. at 857. 
72. Id. at 862 (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 218 (1985)). 
73. Id. at 859. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 862. 
76. Id. 
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Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams77 emphasized that a plaintiff’s 
complaint alone must be the basis for evaluating a § 301 preemption 
claim.  In Williams, several employees began their employment with 
Caterpillar as union workers subject to a collective bargaining 
agreement.78  Eventually, they each were promoted to managerial or 
weekly salaried employees, which were non-unionized positions 
outside the scope of the agreement.79  According to these employees, 
Caterpillar’s management consistently assured them that, if the plant 
ever closed, they would have jobs in other Caterpillar facilities.80  
These employees were later returned to their hourly unionized 
positions, subject to the collective bargaining agreement.81  
Caterpillar eventually closed the plant and laid off this group of 
employees.82  The former employees then filed a lawsuit in state 
court alleging breach of their employment promises and the contract 
that resulted therefrom.83  Caterpillar removed the case to federal 
court and asserted § 301 preemption.84 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s holding that the 
lawsuit was not preempted by § 301.85  The Court began its analysis 
by stating that prior cases had established a two-part test for § 301 
preemption: “Section 301 governs claims founded directly on rights 
created by collective-bargaining agreements, and also claims 
‘substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining 
agreement.’”86  However, the test must focus on the allegations 
contained in a plaintiff’s complaint, not on a defense mounted by an 
employer: 
Caterpillar impermissibly attempts to create the 
prerequisites to removal by ignoring the set of facts (i.e., the 
individual employment contracts) presented by respondents, 
along with their legal characterization of those facts, and 
arguing that there are different facts respondents might have 
alleged that would have constituted a federal claim.  In sum, 
 
77. 482 U.S. 386 (1987). 
78. Id. at 388. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 389. 
81. Id. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 390. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 399. 
86. Id. at 394 (quoting Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 859 n.3 
(1987)). 
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Caterpillar does not seek to point out that the contract relied 
upon by respondents is in fact a collective agreement; rather 
it attempts to justify removal on the basis of facts not 
alleged in the complaint.87      
The Court emphasized the importance of the complaint as the 
touchstone for § 301 preemption in its conclusion: 
But the presence of a federal question, even a § 301 
question, in a defensive argument does not overcome the 
paramount policies embodied in the well-pleaded complaint 
rule – that the plaintiff is the master of the complaint, that a 
federal question must appear on the face of the complaint, 
and that the plaintiff may, by eschewing claims based on 
federal law, choose to have the cause heard in state court.  
When a plaintiff invokes a right created by a collective-
bargaining agreement, the plaintiff has chosen to plead what 
we have held must be regarded as a federal claim, and 
removal is at the defendant’s option.  But a defendant 
cannot, merely by injecting a federal question into an action 
that asserts what is plainly a state-law claim, transform the 
action into one arising under federal law, thereby selecting 
the forum in which the claim shall be litigated.  If a 
defendant could do so, the plaintiff would be master of 
nothing. 88 
Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of an oral contract were not created by, 
or dependent on, the collective bargaining agreement.  The existence 
of provisions in the bargaining agreement which dealt with 
termination of employees and Caterpillar’s duty to reassign laid off 
workers were not determinative of § 301 preemption since the 
complaint was not based on, nor made reference to, such 
provisions.89  The existence of the oral contracts and their breach 
were therefore properly resolved by state, not federal, law.       
The Supreme Court clarified the relationship between § 301 
preemption and the existence of a grievance process in its next 
decision, Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.90  In analyzing 
Lingle, it is important to note that the Lueck opinion stated that the 
holding in Lucas Flour was based in significant part on preserving 
 
87. Id. at 396–97 (emphasis omitted). 
88. Id. at 398–99 (emphases omitted) (footnote omitted). 
89. Id. at 394–95. 
90. 486 U.S. 399 (1988). 
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the effectiveness of arbitration.91  Lingle was injured on the job and 
requested compensation for her medical expenses from Norge 
consistent with Illinois workers’ compensation law.92  Norge 
thereafter discharged her for filing a “false” workers’ compensation 
claim.93  The applicable collective bargaining agreement contained 
provisions protecting unionized workers from discharge except for 
“proper” or “just” cause.94  Lingle’s union promptly filed a grievance 
on her behalf pursuant to the process detailed in the agreement.95  An 
arbitrator eventually ruled in Lingle’s favor, and she received 
reinstatement with full back pay.96  After the grievance was filed, 
Lingle also filed a lawsuit in state court alleging that Norge had fired 
her in retaliation for exercising her rights under Illinois law.97  Norge 
removed the case to federal court and moved to dismiss based on § 
301 preemption.98  The District Court granted Norge’s motion and 
the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of Lingle’s complaint.99 
The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit and held that 
Lingle’s state lawsuit was not preempted by § 301 despite the 
concurrent grievance filing.100  The Court noted that the facts of 
retaliatory discharge did not involve the interpretation of a provision 
in the collective bargaining agreement, but instead focused on “the 
conduct of the employee and the conduct and motivation of the 
employer.”101  Accordingly, “the state-law remedy in this case is 
‘independent’ of the collective-bargaining agreement in the sense of 
‘independent’ that matters for § 301 pre-emption purposes: resolution 
of the state-law claim does not require construing the collective-
bargaining agreement.”102  
The Court of Appeals decided to preempt because the state court 
would be resolving the same facts and deciding the same issue as the 
arbitrator—whether there was just cause to fire Lingle.  The Court 
expressly rejected that analytical similarity as the basis for § 301 
preemption: 
 
91. See supra notes 59–60 and accompanying text.  




96. Id. at 402. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Id.  
100. Id. at 413. 
101. Id. at 407. 
102. Id. 
120 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW Vol. 46 
[Section] 301 pre-emption merely ensures that federal law 
will be the basis for interpreting collective-bargaining 
agreements, and says nothing about the substantive rights a 
State may provide to workers when adjudication of those 
rights does not depend upon the interpretation of such 
agreements.  In other words, even if dispute resolution 
pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement, on the one 
hand, and state law, on the other, would require addressing 
precisely the same set of facts, as long as the state-law claim 
can be resolved without interpreting the agreement itself, the 
claim is “independent” of the agreement for § 301 pre-
emption purposes.103  
The Supreme Court therefore held that the existence of a grievance or 
arbitration process in an applicable collective bargaining agreement 
was not relevant in a § 301 preemption analysis.  While preserving 
the efficacy of arbitration factored into the development of federal 
common law under § 301, preemption under that statutory provision 
focused on the need to interpret a term of the collective bargaining 
agreement in order to resolve the complaint.   
The case United Steelworkers v. Rawson104 presented the Court 
with a state tort claim brought by the survivors of four employees 
against their union.  The workers were miners who were killed in an 
underground fire that occurred at the Sunshine Mine in Kellogg, 
Idaho.105  The “complaint alleged that the miners’ deaths were caused 
by [the] fraudulent and negligent acts” of the union.106  The 
applicable collective bargaining agreement had established a joint 
management-labor safety committee to make the mines safer for 
workers.107  Plaintiffs alleged that the union had inadequately 
prepared its investigators and, as a result, negligently performed 
inspections that failed to detect obvious flaws in the mines.108  The 
Court cited Hechler in holding that the basis of the state tort alleged 
in the complaint—the union’s duty to inspect the mines—was created 
and defined by the collective bargaining agreement.109  Since the 
union did not have a common law duty to provide a safe workplace, 
the complaint could not allege that the union violated the independent 
 
103. Id. at 409–10 (footnote omitted). 
104. 495 U.S. 362 (1990). 
105. Id. at 364. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 365. 
108. Id. at 364–65. 
109. Id. at 370. 
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duty of reasonable care owed to every person in society.110  
Therefore, the Plaintiffs’ complaint was preempted under § 301.111 
The most recent Supreme Court case of significance regarding § 
301 preemption is Livadas v. Bradshaw.112  Livadas was a grocery 
store clerk at Safeway until her discharge.113  Her collective 
bargaining agreement explicitly provided that all disputes relating to 
unjust discharge would be subject to binding arbitration.114  
California state law required that all discharged workers be paid the 
wages owed to them immediately.115  When Lividas was fired on 
January 2, 1990, she demanded her wages immediately.116  Her 
manager refused to pay her, stating that company policy was to mail 
her a check from a central location.117  She received the check on 
January 5, 1990 for all wages due to her through January 2, 1990.118  
She then filed a claim against Safeway with the California Division 
of Labor Standards Enforcement, demanding three days’ wages to 
compensate for the delay.119  The Commissioner refused her claim, 
relying on a policy that statutory wage claims were not available to 
workers covered by collective bargaining agreements.120  Livadas 
filed a lawsuit in federal District Court to enforce payment of her 
claim.121  
The Commissioner argued that § 301 preempted her from paying 
Livadas on her claim since the determination of the amount she 
would be owed would depend on the collective bargaining 
agreement, and federal labor policy favored arbitration to resolve 
these types of grievances.122  The Supreme Court disagreed and held 
that § 301 did not preempt Livadas’ claim: 
 
110. Id. at 371.  The Court cited Hechler, again noting that the situation would be 
different if the lawsuit had been brought against an employer who possesses a 
common law duty to provide a safe workplace.  Id. at 374. 
111. Id. at 372.  The Court also held that, pursuant to § 301 federal common law, mere 
negligence was not enough for the union to violate its duty of fair representation to 
its members.  Id. at 372–73.    
112. 512 U.S. 107 (1994).   
113. Id. at 110. 
114. Id.  
115. Id.  




120. Id. at 112–13. 
121. Id. at 113–14. 
122. Id. at 121. 
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In Lueck and in Lingle . . . we underscored the point that § 
301 cannot be read broadly to pre-empt nonnegotiable rights 
conferred on individual employees as a matter of state law, 
and we stressed that it is the legal character of a claim, as 
“independent” of rights under the collective-bargaining 
agreement . . . that decides whether a state cause of action 
may go forward.  Finally, we were clear that when the 
meaning of contract terms is not the subject of dispute, the 
bare fact that a collective-bargaining agreement will be 
consulted in the course of state-law litigation plainly does 
not require the claim to be extinguished.123   
The only issue in the case—whether Safeway willfully failed to pay 
Livadas’ wages promptly on severance—was strictly a question of 
state law independent of the bargaining agreement.124  Preemption 
was not supported because the collective bargaining agreement 
needed to be referenced in order to determine Livadas’ wage and 
therefore her damages.125  The opinion concluded by noting that § 
301 and other federal labor laws should not be interpreted to deny 
union workers state-law rights granted to all non-union workers, 
especially in the absence of clear and explicit language waiving the 
right if state law permits such a waiver.126 
Williams, Lingle, and Livadas all held that the employee’s claims 
were not preempted.  These three opinions reflect the Supreme 
Court’s belief that many of the lower courts had been reading § 301 
preemption too broadly.  After those decisions, a number of circuits 
revisited their preemption decisions and revised them to conform to 
Supreme Court precedent.127 
III.  PREEMPTION CLARITY    
Although the Supreme Court cases appear to establish clear rules 
for the interpretation of § 301 preemption, lower federal courts 
occasionally have struggled to apply them to a wider range of fact 
patterns.  The Ninth Circuit, in Cramer v. Consolidated 
Freightways,128 noted the difficulty of the task in determining the 
extent of § 301 preemption:   
 
123. Id. at 123–24 (footnotes omitted). 
124. Id. at 124–25. 
125. Id. at 125. 
126. Id. at 128–33. 
127. See infra Part III. 
128. 255 F.3d 683 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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The demarcation between preempted claims and those that 
survive § 301’s reach is not, however, a line that lends itself 
to analytical precision.  As the Supreme Court 
acknowledged in Livadas, “[T]he Courts of Appeals have 
not been entirely uniform in their understanding and 
application of the principles set down in Lingle and [Allis-
Chalmers].”  And little wonder.  “Substantial dependence” 
on a CBA is an inexact concept, turning on the specific facts 
of each case, and the distinction between “looking to” a 
CBA and “interpreting” it is not always clear or amenable to 
a bright-line test.129 
Other circuits have noted the difficulties inherent in § 301 inquiry.130  
However, the case law has in fact developed a number of accepted 
black letter law principles in the preemptive analysis.131 
The Supreme Court in Williams noted that preemption was 
appropriate when a claim was premised on rights directly created by 
a collective bargaining agreement or substantially dependent on an 
analysis of a collective bargaining agreement.132  A two-part test has 
emerged from the application of this language: 
1) Is the right (or corresponding duty) alleged by the 
plaintiff only (or solely) created by the applicable collective 
bargaining agreement?;  and  
 2) Is any element of the state-law claim alleged by the 
plaintiff substantially dependent on the interpretation of a 
term or provision contained in the applicable collective 
bargaining agreement for its resolution?133   
 
129. Id. at 691 (citation omitted). 
130. McCormick v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 934 F.2d 531, 539 (4th Cir. 1991); see also 
Michael Telis, Playing Through the Haze: The NFL Concussion Litigation and 
Section 301 Preemption, 102 GEO. L.J. 1841, 1854–55 (2014). 
131. The circuit courts of appeals were more willing to preempt state-law claims before 
the clarifying Supreme Court decisions of Williams, Lingle, Rawson, and Livadas.  
Both the Third and the Ninth Circuits have explicitly overruled earlier cases as being 
inconsistent with these later Supreme Court decisions.  See Kline v. Sec. Guards, 
Inc., 386 F.3d 246, 258–59 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Cramer, 255 F.3d at 692–93 (9th 
Cir. 2001).   
132. See supra notes 77–89 and accompanying text. 
133. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 265 (1996); Williams v. NFL, 582 
F.3d 863, 874 (8th Cir. 2009); Alongi v. Ford Motor Co., 386 F.3d 716, 724 (6th Cir. 
2004); Goshorn, supra note 4, at 264–65; Telis, supra note 130, at 1849.  The word 
“only” is properly added to the creation of the right or duty because the Supreme 
Court held in Lingle that if a right is created by both state law and the collective 
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If the answer to both questions is no, then the complaint should not 
be preempted.   If the answer to either or both questions is yes, then § 
301 preemption is appropriate and the matter should be resolved by 
substantive federal labor law.  Both questions must be resolved solely 
by an examination of the plaintiff’s complaint.134  The defendant’s 
defensive assertions may not be considered in the resolution of the 
preemptive questions.135    
The first prong of this test is the easiest to apply.  The complaint on 
its face or by necessity must allege a right or duty that is only found 
in a collective bargaining agreement.  This requirement is derived 
from the Supreme Court’s opinions in Hechler and Rawson.  In both 
of those cases, the defendant was a union.136  Because unions were 
not recognized at common law as full legal entities and are mainly 
creatures of federal statutory law, they historically have not been 
subject to common law duties.137  In fact, both opinions noted that the 
respective employers, not the unions, had the independent common 
law duty of reasonable care to maintain a safe workplace owed to 
every member of society.138  The lawsuit, therefore, would not have 
been preempted if brought against the employer.  However, the 
union’s lack of common law duty meant that the right asserted by the 
plaintiffs was necessarily created and defined by the collective 
bargaining agreement.139  Therefore, preemption was appropriate 
since the right and corresponding duty were solely created by 
contract, not state common law or statutory law.   
In a lawsuit against an employer, preemption under this first test 
also applies to any complaint which—explicitly or by necessary 
implication—alleges rights that originate only from a collective 
bargaining agreement.  In Foy v. Pratt & Whitney Group,140 the 
Second Circuit stated that preemption was appropriate if a complaint 
 
bargaining agreement, then the plaintiff is not limited simply to the agreement and 
therefore not preempted.  Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th 
Cir. 2007); Humble v. Boeing Co., 305 F.3d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir. 2002); Sagerian, 
supra note 3, at 252. 
134. Alongi, 386 F.3d at 727; see also Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 397 
(1987). 
135. Humphrey v. Sequentia, Inc., 58 F.3d 1238, 1244 (8th Cir. 1995); see also Williams, 
482 U.S. at 397. 
136. United Steelworkers v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 364 (1990); Int’l Bhd. of Elec. 
Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 853 (1987). 
137. Rawson, 495 U.S. at 369; Hechler, 481 U.S. at 859. 
138. Rawson, 495 U.S. at 371; Hechler, 481 U.S. at 859. 
139. Rawson, 495 U.S. at 370; Hechler, 481 U.S. at 862.  Hechler had in fact explicitly 
conceded that the duty came only from the CBA.  Hechler, 481 U.S. at 854.   
140. 127 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 1997). 
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alleging a state common law “tort premised on the violation of duties 
in the CBA.”141  Former employees in Foy, however, alleged that 
their employer made intentional or negligent misrepresentations to 
them that violated state statutory and common law.142  Foy claimed 
that her employer promised that she would be given an opportunity to 
transfer to another factory prior to any layoff at her current factory.143  
She was laid off without such an opportunity as permitted by the 
terms of her collective bargaining agreement.144  The Second Circuit 
held that Foy’s complaint was not preempted because she alleged 
independent state-law rights and did not reference any collective 
bargaining agreement: “State law—not the CBA—is the source of the 
rights asserted by plaintiffs: the right to be free of economic harm 
caused by misrepresentation.”145  In Cephas v. MVM, Inc.,146 the 
District of Columbia Circuit preempted a state-law-based complaint 
by an employee against his employer alleging that the employer had 
transferred him in violation of its collective bargaining agreement.147  
However, Cephas’s lawsuit was properly preempted because 
“[n]either his complaint nor his brief, however, identifies any source 
of right—such as an individual employment agreement—other than 
the CBA.”148  Accordingly, Cephas’s only recourse was a suit 
pursuant to the substantive federal labor law contained in § 301.149           
The first part of this test is therefore clear in its application.  If the 
defendant in a common law tort suit brought by an employee is a 
union, Hechler and Rawson effectively hold that most common law 
claims will be preempted.  If the defendant in such a case is an 
employer, and the complaint makes no reference to a collective 
bargaining agreement but relies solely on state law, the claim will not 
be preempted pursuant to this part of the test.  A plausible argument 
that the right or duty at issue is not exclusively derived from a 
collective bargaining agreement (but can be grounded on independent 
state grounds) should satisfy this portion of the preemption analysis.   
The limited nature of the first part of the § 301 preemption test, 
however, means that the second prong is the one more frequently in 
 
141. Id. at 235. 
142. Id. at 232. 
143. Id. at 231. 
144. Id.  
145. Id. at 235. 
146. 520 F.3d 480 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
147. Id. at 482. 
148. Id. at 484. 
149. Id.  The court also held that such a § 301 action was not precluded by the applicable 
statute of limitations and could therefore proceed in the district court.  Id. at 490. 
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dispute and, therefore, more difficult to apply.  Preemption of claims 
that are substantially dependent on the interpretation of a term in a 
collective bargaining agreement is required to enforce the policy 
against enforcement of tort claims that are simply cleverly disguised 
contract disputes.150  Interpretive preemption was created by Lueck.  
The employee in that case alleged that his employer had violated a 
state-law duty to process his disability claim in good faith.151  
Accordingly, the right or duty was not created solely by the collective 
bargaining agreement but had an independent basis in state law.  The 
Court therefore could not use the first part of the preemption test as 
defined herein.  However, the opinion noted that the state law at issue 
did not define “good faith”; that determination was a case by case 
inquiry of the applicable standards contained within the collective 
bargaining agreement.152  Thus, the complaint was preempted 
because the definition of the state-law claim necessarily required an 
interpretation of “good faith” as detailed in the collective bargaining 
agreement.153  The need for uniformity in the meaning of terms in 
collective bargaining agreements dictated that terms be defined by 
federal, not state, law.154  The agreement provided in detail the 
meaning of “good faith” in the processing of disability claims.155 
The Lueck result has been the source of confusion as lower courts 
struggle with the issue of whether traditional tort concepts such as 
“reasonable,” “outrageous,” or “reliance” are as vague as “good 
faith,” consequently requiring interpretation of the collective 
bargaining agreement for their definitions.  However, some parts of 
the analysis are clear:  Lueck holds that not all claims related to the 
workplace must be resolved by federal law, and preemption does not 
occur simply because the lawsuit arises from a mandatory subject of 
collective bargaining.156  The circuits have applied this concept to 
mean that preemption cannot occur simply because the general 
subject of the complaint is covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement; defendant must show that the elements of the complaint 
are substantially dependent on a specific provision of the 
agreement.157  Lueck also explicitly states that a complaint alleging 
conduct by a defendant that is illegal under state law may not be 
 
150. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985). 
151. Id. at 206. 
152. Id. at 213. 
153. Id. at 218. 
154. Id. at 211. 
155. Id. at 215–16. 
156. Id. at 212 n.7. 
157. Kline v. Sec. Guards, Inc., 386 F.3d 246, 256 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Berda v. CBS 
Inc., 881 F.2d 20, 27 (3d Cir. 1989)). 
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preempted.158  The circuits have reinforced this rule by holding that a 
collective bargaining agreement could not authorize a violation of 
state or federal law even if it purported to do so.159  Therefore, no 
term would be subject to interpretation.  The illegality exception has 
been extended to include claims that assert a public policy violation 
of a state.160  Employees—under the reasonable person standard from 
tort theory—have a right to assume their employers will obey the law 
since illegal behavior is inherently unreasonable.161  Finally, the 
Supreme Court in Lingle held that preemption would not be 
supported simply because the same facts in the state claim could 
possibly support a grievance pursuant to the collective agreement.162  
The circuits have therefore held that the existence of a grievance 
process in an agreement is irrelevant for preemption purposes.163    
The treatment of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress in the circuit courts of appeals provides a clear illustration of 
the preemption rules in application.  If an employee alleges that an 
employer has committed such a tort, state law requires that the 
employee prove the employer’s conduct to be “outrageous.”164  
However, the term “outrageous” is not defined by tort law, so it must 
be decided on a case-by-case basis.  In Douglas v. American 
Information Technologies Corp., the Seventh Circuit preempted an 
intentional infliction of emotional distress charge because the 
complaint only alleged employer activity that was covered by the 
applicable collective bargaining agreement.165  The court noted that 
the tort did not exist when the employer “has done no more than to 
insist upon his legal rights in a permissible way, even though he is 
well aware that such insistence is certain to cause emotional 
distress.”166  Similarly, in Baker v. Farmers Electric Cooperative, 
Inc., the Fifth Circuit preempted a claim of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress because the plaintiff did not allege any activities 
by the employer that were outside of those sanctioned by the 
 
158. Lueck, 471 U.S. at 212.  The most frequent types of these claims are based on assault 
and battery, retaliatory discharge, and age and gender (especially sexual favors) 
discrimination.  See Goshorn, supra note 4, at 270.  
159. Alongi v. Ford Motor Co., 386 F.3d 716, 727 (6th Cir. 2004). 
160. See Goshorn, supra note 4, at 272–73. 
161. Cramer v. Consol. Freightways, Inc., 255 F.3d 683, 695–96 (9th Cir. 2001). 
162. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
163. See Humphrey v. Sequentia, Inc., 58 F.3d 1238, 1243–44 (8th Cir. 1995). 
164. Baker v. Farmers Elec. Coop., 34 F.3d 274, 280 (5th Cir. 1994); Douglas v. Am. 
Info. Techs. Corp., 877 F.2d 565, 570–71 (7th Cir. 1989).   
165. Douglas, 877 F.2d at 572–73. 
166. Id. at 571 (quoting Pub. Fin. Corp. v. Davis, 360 N.E.2d 765, 768 (Ill. 1976)). 
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collective bargaining agreement: “Baker does not allege that any 
action on the part of the defendants other than his reassignment to a 
maintenance position has caused him mental distress.  He alleges no 
instances of harassment, discrimination, physical abuse, or other 
conduct which would provide grounds for an emotional distress 
claim.”167  
If the collective bargaining agreement could not possibly sanction 
the employer’s activity (e.g., assault and battery or sexual 
harassment), the definition of “outrageous” can be determined 
without reliance on the agreement, and preemption is not 
warranted.168  However, conduct authorized by the bargaining 
agreement—such as the reassignment of an employee here—requires 
interpretation of the agreement in order to define an element of the 
claim.  Such conduct cannot be “outrageous” and preemption is 
mandated.169     
In Lightning v. Roadway Express, Inc.,170 the Eleventh Circuit 
adopted the analysis of the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, but reached a 
different result based on the facts before it.  Lightning alleged that 
Roadway management had spit on him, verbally abused him and tried 
to hit him.171  The court affirmed the District Court’s holding that 
Lightning’s claim was not preempted: 
Contrary to Roadway’s assertions, Lightning’s intentional 
infliction of emotional distress claim does not concern the 
terms and conditions of his employment, but rather the 
severe abuse he endured from Roadway’s supervisors. . . . 
Thus, Lightning’s claim “revolve[s] around conduct by his 
employer that is not even arguably sanctioned by the labor 
contract.”172    
The resolution of the preemption issue thus centered on whether the 
plaintiff’s complaint alleged outrageous conduct by the defendant 
that was outside the scope of the collective bargaining agreement.173 
 
167. Baker, 34 F.3d at 280. 
168. Id. at 280–81.   
169. Id. 
170. 60 F.3d 1551, 1557-58 (11th Cir. 1995). 
171. Id. at 1554–55. 
172. Id. at 1557 (alteration in original) (quoting Keehr v. Consol. Freightways of Del., 
Inc., 825 F.2d 133, 138 n.6 (7th Cir. 1987)). 
173. Other circuit courts of appeals have accepted this distinction between complaints 
which only alleged activity covered by a collective bargaining agreement and those 
which allege actions outside of anything contemplated by the agreement.  See 
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The circuits also agree that non-signatories to the collective 
bargaining agreements may not bring § 301 lawsuits and, therefore, 
are not able to assert § 301 preemption.174  The lower courts also 
have held that § 301 preemption should be granted only when doing 
so furthers the purposes behind the Labor-Management Relations Act 
as stated in Livadas—preventing state law from deciding what parties 
agreed to in a collective bargaining agreement, determining what 
legal consequences flow from breaches of the agreement, and 
permitting parties to renege on their arbitration promises by 
relabeling grievable issues as tort claims.175  Lawsuits involving non-
signatories do not implicate any of the recognized purposes of the 
LMRA and § 301 preemption is therefore appropriately irrelevant to 
such a dispute.     
IV.  PREEMPTION CONFUSION  
The concepts noted in Part III are easy to comprehend as black 
letter law.  However, certain repeated misunderstandings in the 
application of those principles have produced the judicial confusion 
noted in many Courts of Appeals’ opinions.  Most of the difficulties 
are caused by a court expanding the reach of § 301 preemption 
beyond its intended scope.  This judicial overreaching manifests itself 
in four basic ways:  
(1) a lack of clarity regarding what is an element of a claim 
and what is a defense; (2) a decision to preempt because a 
collective bargaining agreement has terms dealing with the 
general subject matter of the complaint, but not the specific 
claim alleged; (3) a different interpretation of the concept of 
“duty”; and (4) an erroneous perception regarding the role 
of a collective bargaining agreement’s grievance process in 
the preemptive assessment. 
As noted above, the case law is clear that preemption analysis 
should be focused solely on the plaintiff’s complaint and not potential 
defenses by the defendant.176  However, even this seemingly “bright 
 
Perugini v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 935 F.2d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1991); Fox v. Parker 
Hannifin Corp., 914 F.2d 795, 802 (6th Cir. 1990). 
174. See Jackson v. Kimel, 992 F.2d 1318, 1325 n.4 (4th Cir. 1993); UMWA v. Covenant 
Coal Corp., 977 F.2d 895, 898 (4th Cir. 1992); see also Goshorn, supra note 4, at 
271–72. 
175. Foy v. Pratt & Whitney Grp., 127 F.3d 229, 234 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Livadas v. 
Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 122–23 (1994)). 
176. See supra Parts II–III. 
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line” test can be difficult to apply as judges disagree on what is 
defined as an element of the claim and what is properly characterized 
as a defense.  This distinction split an en banc panel on the Fourth 
Circuit regarding application of § 301 preemption to a claim of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress in McCormick v. AT&T 
Technologies, Inc.177  McCormick alleged that, after he was 
terminated, an AT&T supervisor forced open his locker, removed his 
personal possessions, and threw them in the trash.178  McCormick’s 
complaint alleged that, pursuant to Virginia tort law, such a 
disposition constituted an intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
negligent infliction of the same, conversion, and negligence in the 
care of a bailment.179  Both the majority and the dissent agreed that 
the critical inquiry involved the location of the defendant’s duty.180  
The majority concluded that, under Virginia law, the plaintiff had the 
burden of proving that the defendant engaged in wrongful conduct 
that was also “outrageous and intolerable.”181  Both elements required 
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement for a resolution:   
If management owed him no duty and was entitled under the 
agreement to dispose of the contents of his locker in the 
manner it did, its actions ipso facto could not have been 
wrongful under state law. . . . If management’s actions in 
disposing of the contents of McCormick’s locker were 
authorized under the collective bargaining agreement, those 
actions could not simultaneously be considered “outrageous 
and intolerable” under Virginia law.182    
The majority perceived that the plaintiff must establish the 
defendant’s duty, and his claims were preempted since interpretation 
of the collective bargaining agreement was essential to determining 
that issue.183   
The dissent argued vigorously that applicable Supreme Court 
precedent indicated that preemption was appropriate when the 
defendant’s duty could be located only in the collective bargaining 
agreement.184  The dissent believed the majority reached the wrong 
 
177. See McCormick v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 934 F.2d 531, 531 (4th Cir. 1991) (4-3 
decision). 
178. Id. at 533. 
179. Id.  
180. Id. at 542, 543 (Phillips, J., dissenting).  
181. Id. at 535 (majority opinion). 
182. Id. at 537. 
183. See id. at 535–37. 
184. Id. at 543 (Phillips, J., dissenting). 
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conclusion by failing to look solely at the plaintiff’s complaint, but 
instead considered the entire action—claims and defenses—in 
evaluating the propriety of preemption.185  Such methodology was in 
direct conflict with repeated Supreme Court holdings that the 
complaint alone should be considered in the assessment.186  The 
dissent then concluded with addressing what the relevant issue should 
be: 
[W]hether McCormick’s well-pleaded state-law tort claim 
locates the duty allegedly violated by AT & T in their labor 
contact [sic] or in some source of legal duty independent of 
that contract.  The answer to that issue is plain: in an 
independent source, Virginia tort law.  Specifically, in the 
duty imposed by that body of law upon all persons, running 
to society in general and not dependent upon any 
employment relationships, (1) not to engage in intentional or 
reckless conduct (2) that is outrageous and intolerable, 
offending generally accepted standards of decency . . . .187  
The issue of whether AT&T was authorized to open the locker and 
dispose of its contents was a defense that should be resolved properly 
at trial, not in a preemption motion.188  Since the tort duty pled in the 
complaint could be determined without reference to any collective 
bargaining agreement, the dissent concluded that McCormick’s 
claims should not be preempted.189  
McCormick confused the preemption analysis by incorrectly 
focusing on whether the defendant’s conduct was authorized by the 
collective bargaining agreement.190  This emphasis is inconsistent 
with the accepted rule that a defense cannot support a preemption 
decision.  The majority should have adopted the analysis of other 
circuits that have considered the issue: did the complaint allege 
behavior outside of the scope of activities covered by the collective 
bargaining agreement?191  If yes, then the defendant’s duty is 
independently grounded in state law and preemption is inappropriate; 
if no, then the complaint is substantially dependent on the contract 
 
185. See id. at 544. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. at 545. 
188. See id.  
189. Id. at 547. 
190. See id. at 544. 
191. See cases cited supra notes 163–73 and accompanying text. 
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and preemption should be applied.  Since the collective bargaining 
agreement never mentioned lockers or the employer’s ability to open 
them, preemption in McCormick was inappropriate because the 
complaint alleged behavior outside the scope of the collective 
bargaining agreement.192 
The McCormick majority compounded its error by relying on 
general provisions of the collective bargaining agreement to justify 
opening the locker and disposing of its contents.  The actual 
collective bargaining agreement contained no authorization for 
opening an employee’s locker and no provision for dealing with the 
disposition of its contents.193  Instead, the majority relied on a general 
management rights provision and the existence of a grievance process 
for any mandatory subject of bargaining.194  Precedent clearly has 
established that a specific provision in an agreement is needed to 
support preemption; it cannot be granted simply because the claim 
relates to a mandatory subject of bargaining or the agreement deals 
with the general subject matter of the complaint. 
This type of error is also illustrated by comparing two cases 
regarding concussions in  professional football: Duerson v. NFL195 
and Green v. Arizona Cardinals Football Club LLC.196  In Duerson, 
the estate of a deceased football player sued the NFL for negligence, 
fraudulent concealment, and negligent failure to warn regarding the 
organization’s knowledge of the dangers of concussions in 
professional football and its failure to inform players of the brain 
damage possible from such concussions.197  The district court 
preempted all of the plaintiff’s claims by accepting the NFL’s 
argument that the state-law tort standard of reasonableness required 
interpretation of the terms of the NFL’s collective bargaining 
agreements.198  The court then cited multiple provisions dealing with 
player health and concluded that those provisions might be 
interpreted to impose a general duty on the NFL clubs to provide 
health care for players.199  The opinion then stated that the 
agreement’s imposition of health care duties on the clubs could 
justify a lower standard of reasonableness for the NFL than generally 
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required for state tort law.200  The decision failed to identify a 
specific term of the collective bargaining agreement, relying instead 
on the agreement’s general inclusion of player health issues.  As 
noted above, this methodology is inconsistent with preemption 
precedent.   
In Green, a district court faced a preemption claim similar to 
Duerson in the context of a lawsuit against an NFL Club for 
negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and fraudulent concealment 
in failing to inform players about potential brain injuries from 
concussions.201  The defendant argued the same collective bargaining 
agreement provisions regarding general player safety that were 
accepted by Duerson.202  The Green opinion, however, correctly 
rejected the same preemption motion granted by the Duerson 
opinion.203  The opinion noted, “[H]ere the duties arise out of the 
common law based upon the employer-employee relationship and not 
out of any particular terms in the CBAs.”204  The plaintiffs’ right to 
rely is similarly situated in their common law status as employees, 
not a term in the collective bargaining agreement.205  The opinion 
further stated that the complaint is not alleging that the Club failed to 
provide anything required by the agreement; the complaint does not 
allege that the Club failed to provide a certified trainer or give pre-
season physicals.206  The complaint simply alleges that the Club 
failed to provide a safe workplace or provide warnings of dangers the 
players could not reasonably have been expected to be aware of, as 
required by Missouri common law of torts.207 Green is therefore 
consistent with preemption precedent.   
Another area of confusion is the ambiguous use of the term “duty” 
by courts.  The concept of a defendant’s duty can arise in the first 
prong of the preemption test as reciprocal of the plaintiff’s right.208  
As noted above, that duty can be resolved by analyzing whether the 
duty is found only in the collective bargaining agreement.209  
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However, duty also can be raised as an issue in the second prong of 
the preemption test when it is included as an element in a plaintiff’s 
common law tort claim.210  A court may look to the collective 
bargaining agreement as interpreting the common law element, as did 
the courts in McCormick and Duerson.211  In this vein, the duty issue 
is best resolved by only looking at the plaintiff’s complaint and 
analyzing whether it alleges rights or duties outside of a specific term 
in the collective agreement.212  If it does, the duty is not substantially 
dependent on the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement; 
if it does not, the duty is dependent and the interpretation of an 
essential element of the claim justifies preemption.  The dissent in 
McCormick confused this distinction by stating that preemption is 
applicable when the duty is found only in a collective bargaining 
agreement.213  The dissent had previously stated that the case was 
concerned with the second prong of the test—whether the complaint 
was substantially dependent upon a term of the collective bargaining 
agreement.214  This portion of the analysis should have been utilized 
only in the first prong of the test, not the second, interpretive 
prong.215  Duerson is more confused by stating that it was only 
employing the interpretive part of the test, but also stating at one 
point, “[s]howing that a duty raised in a state-law tort claim 
originates in a CBA is certainly sufficient to require preemption” and 
citing Rawson.216  Duerson did not properly delineate the differences 
between the two independent parts of the accepted preemption test, 
but simply blended the two together. 
The concept of duty has been confused even further because of a 
quote by Justice White in Rawson: “This is not a situation where the 
Union’s delegates are accused of acting in a way that might violate 
the duty of reasonable care owed to every person in society.”217  
Some courts have interpreted this language to mean that, for 
preemption purposes, the defendant’s duty must be more than the 
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common law tort duty and must be owed to everyone.218  Such a 
reading is too broad.  The better interpretation is that Justice White 
intended to reference traditional common law tort duty: a general 
duty owed to the public at large.219  Even if the narrower reading is 
incorrect, the most important preemption inquiry is the source of the 
defendant’s duty, not individuals to whom it is owed.220            
The final major source of confusion is the ambivalent use of a 
collective bargaining agreement’s grievance process by the Supreme 
Court.  Livadas specifically stated that one of the purposes of the 
LMRA, which supports preemption, is not to allow employers or 
employees “to renege on their arbitration promises by ‘relabeling’” 
grievable issues as tort claims.221  On the other hand, Lingle 
specifically stated that preemption is not appropriate even if the state-
law claim encompasses the same set of facts as a grievance process as 
long as the compliant can be resolved without interpretation of the 
agreement.222  Therefore, the Supreme Court has stated that the 
existence of a possible grievance process is not relevant to 
determining whether a claim is independent of the agreement, but 
courts must be diligent to prohibit attempts to avoid the grievance 
process.  
The Lueck decision both created the confusion and provided the 
basis for its ultimate resolution.  The use of the disjunctive “or” at the 
conclusion of the opinion implies that the preemption issue is a 
separate analysis from the meaning of the substantive federal 
common law which should ultimately resolve the case.223  Therefore, 
the existence of a grievance provision ending in arbitration was not 
relevant to the preemption result, but would be important in applying 
§ 301 substantive law.  The preemption issue should be resolved by 
determining whether the state claim relied on a non-negotiable state-
law right or is “inextricably intertwined” with the terms of a 
collective bargaining agreement.224  If the claim was substantially 
dependent on a term or provisions of the collective bargaining 
agreement, then substantive § 301 common law dictated that the 
plaintiff should not succeed because he failed to follow the grievance 
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procedure in the collective bargaining agreement.  The Court 
confused the issue by stating early in the opinion that Lueck’s state-
law claim was preempted because of the national policy of 
encouraging arbitration.225  Lucas Flour, cited by Lueck, correctly 
placed arbitration in the substantive law of § 301. 
Therefore, the proper resolution of this ambiguity should be that 
the existence of a grievance process is irrelevant to the decision of 
whether a claim is independent of the collective bargaining 
agreement.  That analysis should proceed as detailed in this Article.  
If the claim is independent of the collective bargaining agreement, 
then preemption is inappropriate and the existence of a possible (or 
actual in Lingle) grievance should be ignored.  However, if the claim 
is found to be substantially dependent on a term in the collective 
bargaining agreement, then the grievance process is the appropriate 
forum for raising the claim.226    
V. CONCLUSION 
Much of the confusion in applying § 301 is related to a judicial 
desire to expand the scope of its preemptive reach.  The analysis 
contained in this Article is premised on a narrower exclusion of state 
common law tort claims.  The language in the relevant Supreme 
Court cases supports this perspective.  In Lueck, the Court used the 
phrase “inextricably intertwined” to describe the relationship between 
a claim and a term of a collective bargaining agreement that justifies 
preemption.227   In Williams, the Court used the phrase “substantially 
dependent” to illustrate the fit between the complaint and collective 
bargaining agreement needed to support preemption.228  The adverbs 
contained in those formulations indicate that the relationship between 
the claim and a term in the contract must be close in order to support 
preemption.  In Livadas, the Court described § 301 preemption as a 
“sensible acorn” and not a “mighty oak.”229  The analogy is the 
Supreme Court’s statement that a broad preemption of state common 
law claims is inappropriate.  The Ninth Circuit has explicitly stated 
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that § 301 preemption should be narrowly interpreted.230  The dissent 
in McCormick acknowledges that its analysis:  
[Section 301] dictates a comparably limited scope for the 
preemptive force of that statute.  It obviously preempts 
state-law claims formally alleging violations of labor 
contracts – the exact and only kind expressly made federal 
ones by § 301.  Beyond those, it only preempts, as a matter 
of judicial interpretation, state-law claims that can be 
determined to be claims for violation of labor contracts in 
substance though not in form, and those only out of the felt 
necessity that parties not be allowed “to evade the 
requirements of § 301 by relabeling their contract claims as 
claims for tortious breach of contract.”231    
In fact, some scholars have argued that the limited scope of this 
inquiry means that intentional torts should never be preempted.232      
The narrow interpretation embraced by this Article is consistent 
with Supreme Court opinions and significantly reduces the confusion 
regarding the application of § 301 preemption.  This approach also 
restores the balance between the common law rights of unionized and 
non-unionized workers.233  Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court 
intended to restrict state common law tort claims unless there were 
clear indications that the plaintiff was, in effect, filing a disguised 
contract claim.  The proposals contained herein reinvigorate the true 
meaning of § 301 while still preserving the grievance process for 
those contract claims that are properly within its jurisdiction. 
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